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Abstract
The paper presents Tendermint, a new protocol for ordering events in a distributed network under adversarial
conditions. More commonly known as Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus or atomic broadcast, the problem
has attracted significant attention in recent years due to the widespread success of blockchain-based digital
currencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, which successfully solved the problem in a public setting without a
central authority. Tendermint modernizes classic academic work on the subject and simplifies the design of the
BFT algorithm by relying on a peer-to-peer gossip protocol among nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consensus is one of the most fundamental problems in distributed computing. It is important because of
it’s role in State Machine Replication (SMR), a generic approach for replicating services that can be modeled
as a deterministic state machine [1], [2]. The key idea of this approach is that service replicas start in the same
initial state, and then execute requests (also called transactions) in the same order; thereby guaranteeing that
replicas stay in sync with each other. The role of consensus in the SMR approach is ensuring that all replicas
receive transactions in the same order. Traditionally, deployments of SMR based systems are in data-center
settings (local area network), have a small number of replicas (three to seven) and are typically part of a single
administration domain (e.g., Chubby [3]); therefore they handle benign (crash) failures only, as more general
forms of failure (in particular, malicious or Byzantine faults) are considered to occur with only negligible
probability.
The success of cryptocurrencies or blockchain systems in recent years (e.g., [4], [5]) pose a whole new set of
challenges on the design and deployment of SMR based systems: reaching agreement over wide area network,
among large number of nodes (hundreds or thousands) that are not part of the same administration domain,
and where a subset of nodes can behave maliciously (Byzantine faults). Furthermore, contrary to the previous
data-center deployments where nodes are fully connected to each other, in blockchain systems, a node is only
connected to a subset of other nodes, so communication is achieved by gossip-based peer-to-peer protocols.
The new requirements demand designs and algorithms that are not necessarily present in the classical academic
literature on Byzantine fault tolerant consensus (or SMR) systems (e.g., [6], [7]) as the primary focus was
different setup.
In this paper we describe a novel Byzantine-fault tolerant consensus algorithm that is the core of the
BFT SMR platform called Tendermint1. The Tendermint platform consists of a high-performance BFT SMR
1The Tendermint platform is available open source at https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint.
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2implementation written in Go, a flexible interface for building arbitrary deterministic applications above the
consensus, and a suite of tools for deployment and management.
The Tendermint consensus algorithm is inspired by the PBFT SMR algorithm [8] and the DLS algorithm
for authenticated faults (the Algorithm 2 from [6]). Similar to DLS algorithm, Tendermint proceeds in rounds2,
where each round has a dedicated proposer (also called coordinator or leader) and a process proceeds to a new
round as part of normal processing (not only in case the proposer is faulty or suspected as being faulty by
enough processes as in PBFT). The communication pattern of each round is very similar to the ”normal” case
of PBFT. Therefore, in preferable conditions (correct proposer, timely and reliable communication between
correct processes), Tendermint decides in three communication steps (the same as PBFT).
The major novelty and contribution of the Tendermint consensus algorithm is a new termination mechanism.
As explained in [9], [10], the existing BFT consensus (and SMR) algorithms for the partially synchronous system
model (for example PBFT [8], [6], [11]) typically relies on the communication pattern illustrated in Figure 1
for termination. The Figure 1 illustrates messages exchanged during the proposer change when processes start a
new round3. It guarantees that eventually (ie. after some Global Stabilization Time, GST), there exists a round
with a correct proposer that will bring the system into a univalent configuration. Intuitively, in a round in which
the proposed value is accepted by all correct processes, and communication between correct processes is timely
and reliable, all correct processes decide.
p1
p2
p3
p4
v1
v2
v3
v4
x, [v1..4]
x, [v1..4]
x, [v1..4]
x, [v1..4]
Fig. 1: Proposer (coordinator) change: p1 is the new proposer.
To ensure that a proposed value is accepted by all correct processes4 a proposer will 1) build the global state
by receiving messages from other processes, 2) select the safe value to propose and 3) send the selected value
together with the signed messages received in the first step to support it. The value vi that a correct process
sends to the next proposer normally corresponds to a value the process considers as acceptable for a decision:
• in PBFT [8] and DLS [6] it is not the value itself but a set of 2f + 1 signed messages with the same
value id,
• in Fast Byzantine Paxos [11] the value itself is being sent.
2Tendermint is not presented in the basic round model of [6]. Furthermore, we use the term round differently than in [6]; in Tendermint
a round denotes a sequence of communication steps instead of a single communication step in [6].
3There is no consistent terminology in the distributed computing terminology on naming sequence of communication steps that
corresponds to a logical unit. It is sometimes called a round, phase or a view.
4The proposed value is not blindly accepted by correct processes in BFT algorithms. A correct process always verifies if the proposed
value is safe to be accepted so that safety properties of consensus are not violated.
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3In both cases, using this mechanism in our system model (ie. high number of nodes over gossip based
network) would have high communication complexity that increases with the number of processes: in the first
case as the message sent depends on the total number of processes, and in the second case as the value (block
of transactions) is sent by each process. The set of messages received in the first step are normally piggybacked
on the proposal message (in the Figure 1 denoted with [v1..4]) to justify the choice of the selected value x.
Note that sending this message also does not scale with the number of processes in the system.
We designed a novel termination mechanism for Tendermint that better suits the system model we consider.
It does not require additional communication (neither sending new messages nor piggybacking information on
the existing messages) and it is fully based on the communication pattern that is very similar to the normal
case in PBFT [8]. Therefore, there is only a single mode of execution in Tendermint, i.e., there is no separation
between the normal and the recovery mode, which is the case in other PBFT-like protocols (e.g., [8], [12] or
[13]). We believe this makes Tendermint simpler to understand and implement correctly.
Note that the orthogonal approach for reducing message complexity in order to improve scalability and
decentralization (number of processes) of BFT consensus algorithms is using advanced cryptography (for
example Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signatures [14]) as done for example in SBFT [15].
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II defines the system model and gives the problem
definitions. Tendermint consensus algorithm is presented in Section III and the proofs are given in Section IV.
We conclude in Section V.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Model
We consider a system of processes that communicate by exchanging messages. Processes can be correct or
faulty, where a faulty process can behave in an arbitrary way, i.e., we consider Byzantine faults. We assume
that each process has some amount of voting power (voting power of a process can be 0). Processes in our
model are not part of a single administration domain; therefore we cannot enforce a direct network connectivity
between all processes. Instead, we assume that each process is connected to a subset of processes called peers,
such that there is an indirect communication channel between all correct processes. Communication between
processes is established using a gossip protocol [16].
Formally, we model the network communication using the partially synchronous system model [6]: in all
executions of the system there is a bound ∆ and an instant GST (Global Stabilization Time) such that all
communication among correct processes after GST is reliable and ∆-timely, i.e., if a correct process p sends
message m at time t ≥ GST to correct process q, then q will receive m before t+∆5. Messages among correct
processes can be delayed, dropped or duplicated before GST. Spoofing/impersonation attacks are assumed to be
impossible at all times due to the use of public-key cryptography. The bound ∆ and GST are system parameters
whose values are not required to be known for the safety of our algorithm. Termination of the algorithm is
guaranteed within a bounded duration after GST. In practice, the algorithm will work correctly in the slightly
weaker variant of the model where the system alternates between (long enough) good periods (corresponds to
5Note that as we do not assume direct communication channels among all correct processes, this implies that before the message m
reaches q, it might pass through a number of correct processes that will forward the message m using gossip protocol towards q.
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4the after GST period where system is reliable and ∆-timely) and bad periods (corresponds to the period before
GST during which the system is asynchronous and messages can be lost), but considering the GST model
simplifies the discussion.
We assume that process steps (which might include sending and receiving messages) take zero time.
Processes are equipped with clocks so they can measure local timeouts. All protocol messages are signed,
i.e., when a correct process q receives a signed message m from its peer, the process q can verify who was the
original sender of the message m.
The details of the Tendermint gossip protocol will be discussed in a separate technical report. For the sake
of this report it is sufficient to assume that messages are being gossiped between processes and the following
property holds (in addition to the partial synchrony network assumptions):
• Gossip communication: If a correct process p receives some message m at time t, all correct processes
will receive m before max{t, GST }+∆.
B. State Machine Replication
State machine replication (SMR) is a general approach for replicating services modeled as a deterministic
state machine [1], [2]. The key idea of this approach is to guarantee that all replicas start in the same state
and then apply requests from clients in the same order, thereby guaranteeing that the replicas’ states will not
diverge. Following Schneider [2], we note that the following is key for implementing a replicated state machine
tolerant to (Byzantine) faults:
• Replica Coordination. All [non-faulty] replicas receive and process the same sequence of requests.
Moreover, as Schneider also notes, this property can be decomposed into two parts, Agreement and Order:
Agreement requires all (non-faulty) replicas to receive all requests, and Order requires that the order of received
requests is the same at all replicas.
There is an additional requirement that needs to be ensured by Byzantine tolerant state machine replica-
tion: only requests (called transactions in the Tendermint terminology) proposed by clients are executed. In
Tendermint, transaction verification is the responsibility of the service that is being replicated; upon receiving
a transaction from the client, the Tendermint process will ask the service if the request is valid, and only valid
requests will be processed.
C. Consensus
Tendermint solves state machine replication by sequentially executing consensus instances to agree on
each block of transactions that are then executed by the service being replicated. We consider a variant of
the Byzantine consensus problem called Validity Predicate-based Byzantine consensus that is motivated by
blockchain systems [17]. The problem is defined by an agreement, a termination, and a validity property.
• Agreement: No two correct processes decide on different values.
• Termination: All correct processes eventually decide on a value.
• Validity: A decided value is valid, i.e., it satisfies the predefined predicate denoted valid().
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5This variant of the Byzantine consensus problem has an application-specific valid() predicate to indicate
whether a value is valid. In the context of blockchain systems, for example, a value is not valid if it does not
contain an appropriate hash of the last value (block) added to the blockchain.
III. TENDERMINT CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
In this section we present the Tendermint Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus algorithm. The algorithm is
specified by the pseudo-code listing in Algorithm 1. We present the algorithm as a set of upon rules that
are executed atomically6. We assume that processes exchange protocol messages using a gossip protocol and
that both received and sent messages are stored in a local message log for every process. An upon rule is
triggered once the message log contains messages such that the corresponding condition evaluates to true.
The condition that assumes reception of X messages of a particular type and content denotes reception of
messages whose senders have aggregate voting power at least equal to X . For example, the condition 2f + 1
〈PRECOMMIT, hp, r, id(v)〉, evaluates to true upon reception of PRECOMMIT messages for height hp, a round
r and with value equal to id(v) whose senders have aggregate voting power at least equal to 2f + 1. Some of
the rules ends with ”for the first time” constraint to denote that it is triggered only the first time a corresponding
condition evaluates to true. This is because those rules do not always change the state of algorithm variables
so without this constraint, the algorithm could keep executing those rules forever. The variables with index p
are process local state variables, while variables without index p are value placeholders. The sign ∗ denotes
any value.
We denote with n the total voting power of processes in the system, and we assume that the total voting
power of faulty processes in the system is bounded with a system parameter f . The algorithm assumes that
n > 3f , i.e., it requires that the total voting power of faulty processes is smaller than one third of the total
voting power. For simplicity we present the algorithm for the case n = 3f + 1.
The algorithm proceeds in rounds, where each round has a dedicated proposer. The mapping of rounds to
proposers is known to all processes and is given as a function proposer(h, round), returning the proposer for
the round round in the consensus instance h. We assume that the proposer selection function is weighted round-
robin, where processes are rotated proportional to their voting power7. The internal protocol state transitions
are triggered by message reception and by expiration of timeouts. There are three timeouts in Algorithm
1: timeoutPropose, timeoutPrevote and timeoutPrecommit. The timeouts prevent the algorithm from
blocking and waiting forever for some condition to be true, ensure that processes continuously transition between
rounds, and guarantee that eventually (after GST) communication between correct processes is timely and
reliable so they can decide. The last role is achieved by increasing the timeouts with every new round r, i.e,
timeoutX(r) = initT imeoutX+ r ∗ timeoutDelta; they are reset for every new height (consensus instance).
Processes exchange the following messages in Tendermint: PROPOSAL, PREVOTE and PRECOMMIT.
The PROPOSAL message is used by the proposer of the current round to suggest a potential decision value,
while PREVOTE and PRECOMMIT are votes for a proposed value. According to the classification of consensus
6In case several rules are active at the same time, the first rule to be executed is picked randomly. The correctness of the algorithm does
not depend on the order in which rules are executed.
7A validator with more voting power is selected more frequently, proportional to its power. More precisely, during a sequence of rounds
of size n, every process is proposer in a number of rounds equal to its voting power.
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6Algorithm 1 Tendermint consensus algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: hp := 0 /* current height, or consensus instance we are currently executing */
3: roundp := 0 /* current round number */
4: stepp ∈ {propose, prevote, precommit}
5: decisionp[] := nil
6: lockedV aluep := nil
7: lockedRoundp := −1
8: validV aluep := nil
9: validRoundp := −1
10: upon start do StartRound(0)
11: Function StartRound(round) :
12: roundp ← round
13: stepp ← propose
14: if proposer(hp, roundp) = p then
15: if validV aluep 6= nil then
16: proposal ← validV aluep
17: else
18: proposal ← getV alue()
19: broadcast 〈PROPOSAL, hp, roundp, proposal, validRoundp〉
20: else
21: schedule OnTimeoutPropose(hp , roundp) to be executed after timeoutPropose(roundp)
22: upon 〈PROPOSAL, hp, roundp, v,−1〉 from proposer(hp, roundp) while stepp = propose do
23: if valid(v) ∧ (lockedRoundp = −1 ∨ lockedV aluep = v) then
24: broadcast 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, id(v)〉
25: else
26: broadcast 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, nil〉
27: stepp ← prevote
28: upon 〈PROPOSAL, hp, roundp, v, vr〉 from proposer(hp, roundp) AND 2f + 1 〈PREVOTE, hp, vr, id(v)〉 while
stepp = propose ∧ (vr ≥ 0 ∧ vr < roundp) do
29: if valid(v) ∧ (lockedRoundp ≤ vr ∨ lockedV aluep = v) then
30: broadcast 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, id(v)〉
31: else
32: broadcast 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, nil〉
33: stepp ← prevote
34: upon 2f + 1 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, ∗〉 while stepp = prevote for the first time do
35: schedule OnTimeoutPrevote(hp , roundp) to be executed after timeoutPrevote(roundp)
36: upon 〈PROPOSAL, hp, roundp, v, ∗〉 from proposer(hp, roundp) AND 2f + 1 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, id(v)〉 while
valid(v) ∧ stepp ≥ prevote for the first time do
37: if stepp = prevote then
38: lockedV aluep ← v
39: lockedRoundp ← roundp
40: broadcast 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, roundp, id(v))〉
41: stepp ← precommit
42: validV aluep ← v
43: validRoundp ← roundp
44: upon 2f + 1 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, nil〉 while stepp = prevote do
45: broadcast 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, roundp, nil〉
46: stepp ← precommit
47: upon 2f + 1 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, roundp, ∗〉 for the first time do
48: schedule OnTimeoutPrecommit(hp , roundp) to be executed after timeoutPrecommit(roundp)
49: upon 〈PROPOSAL, hp, r, v, ∗〉 from proposer(hp, r) AND 2f + 1 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, r, id(v)〉 while decisionp[hp] = nil do
50: if valid(v) then
51: decisionp[hp] = v
52: hp ← hp + 1
53: reset lockedRoundp, lockedV aluep , validRoundp and validV aluep to initial values and empty message log
54: StartRound(0)
55: upon f + 1 〈∗, hp, round, ∗, ∗〉 with round > roundp do
56: StartRound(round)
57: Function OnTimeoutPropose(height, round) :
58: if height = hp ∧ round = roundp ∧ stepp = propose then
59: broadcast 〈PREVOTE, hp, roundp, nil〉
60: stepp ← prevote
61: Function OnTimeoutPrevote(height, round) :
62: if height = hp ∧ round = roundp ∧ stepp = prevote then
63: broadcast 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, roundp, nil〉
64: stepp ← precommit
65: Function OnTimeoutPrecommit(height, round) :
66: if height = hp ∧ round = roundp then
67: StartRound(roundp + 1)
September 25, 2018 DRAFT
7algorithms from [10], Tendermint, like PBFT [7] and DLS [6], belongs to class 3, so it requires two voting steps
(three communication exchanges in total) to decide a value. The Tendermint consensus algorithm is designed
for the blockchain context where the value to decide is a block of transactions (ie. it is potentially quite large,
consisting of many transactions). Therefore, in the Algorithm 1 (similar as in [7]) we are explicit about sending
a value (block of transactions) and a small, constant size value id (a unique value identifier, normally a hash
of the value, i.e., if id(v) = id(v′), then v = v′). The PROPOSAL message is the only one carrying the
value; PREVOTE and PRECOMMIT messages carry the value id. A correct process decides on a value v in
Tendermint upon receiving the PROPOSAL for v and 2f +1 voting-power equivalent PRECOMMIT messages
for id(v) in some round r. In order to send PRECOMMIT message for v in a round r, a correct process waits
to receive the PROPOSAL and 2f +1 of the corresponding PREVOTE messages in the round r. Otherwise, it
sends PRECOMMIT message with a special nil value. This ensures that correct processes can PRECOMMIT
only a single value (or nil) in a round. As proposers may be faulty, the proposed value is treated by correct
processes as a suggestion (it is not blindly accepted), and a correct process tells others if it accepted the
PROPOSAL for value v by sending PREVOTE message for id(v); otherwise it sends PREVOTE message
with the special nil value.
Every process maintains the following variables in the Algorithm 1: step, lockedV alue, lockedRound,
validV alue and validRound. The step denotes the current state of the internal Tendermint state machine, i.e.,
it reflects the stage of the algorithm execution in the current round. The lockedV alue stores the most recent
value (with respect to a round number) for which a PRECOMMIT message has been sent. The lockedRound
is the last round in which the process sent a PRECOMMIT message that is not nil. We also say that a correct
process locks a value v in a round r by setting lockedV alue = v and lockedRound = r before sending
PRECOMMIT message for id(v). As a correct process can decide a value v only if 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT
messages for id(v) are received, this implies that a possible decision value is a value that is locked by at least
f +1 voting power equivalent of correct processes. Therefore, any value v for which PROPOSAL and 2f +1
of the corresponding PREVOTE messages are received in some round r is a possible decision value. The role
of the validV alue variable is to store the most recent possible decision value; the validRound is the last
round in which validV alue is updated. Apart from those variables, a process also stores the current consensus
instance (hp, called height in Tendermint), and the current round number (roundp) and attaches them to every
message. Finally, a process also stores an array of decisions, decisionp (Tendermint assumes a sequence of
consensus instances, one for each height).
Every round starts by a proposer suggesting a value with the PROPOSAL message (see line 19). In the initial
round of each height, the proposer is free to chose the value to suggest. In the Algorithm 1, a correct process
obtains a value to propose using an external function getV alue() that returns a valid value to propose. In the
following rounds, a correct proposer will suggest a new value only if validV alue = nil; otherwise validV alue
is proposed (see lines 15-18). In addition to the value proposed, the PROPOSAL message also contains the
validRound so other processes are informed about the last round in which the proposer observed validV alue
as a possible decision value. Note that if a correct proposer p sends validV alue with the validRound in the
PROPOSAL, this implies that the process p received PROPOSAL and the corresponding 2f + 1 PREVOTE
messages for validV alue in the round validRound. If a correct process sends PROPOSAL message with
validV alue (validRound > −1) at time t > GST , by the Gossip communication property, the corresponding
PROPOSAL and the PREVOTE messages will be received by all correct processes before time t+∆. Therefore,
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8all correct processes will be able to verify the correctness of the suggested value as it is supported by the
PROPOSAL and the corresponding 2f + 1 voting power equivalent PREVOTE messages.
A correct process p accepts the proposal for a value v (send PREVOTE for id(v)) if an external valid
function returns true for the value v, and if p hasn’t locked any value (lockedRound = −1) or p has
locked the value v (lockedV alue = v); see the line 23. In case the proposed pair is (v, vr ≥ 0) and a
correct process p has locked some value, it will accept v if it is a more recent possible decision value8,
vr > lockedRoundp, or if lockedV alue = v (see line 29). Otherwise, a correct process will reject the
proposal by sending PREVOTE message with nil value. A correct process will send PREVOTE message with
nil value also in case timeoutPropose expired (it is triggered when a correct process starts a new round) and
a process has not sent PREVOTE message in the current round yet (see the line 57).
If a correct process receives PROPOSAL message for some value v and 2f + 1 PREVOTE messages
for id(v), then it sends PRECOMMIT message with id(v). Otherwise, it sends PRECOMMIT nil. A correct
process will send PRECOMMIT message with nil value also in case timeoutPrevote expired (it is started
when a correct process sent PREVOTE message and received any 2f +1 PREVOTE messages) and a process
has not sent PRECOMMIT message in the current round yet (see the line 65). A correct process decides on
some value v if it receives in some round r PROPOSAL message for v and 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT messages
with id(v) (see the line 51). To prevent the algorithm from blocking and waiting forever for this condition
to be true, the Algorithm 1 relies on timeoutPrecommit. It is triggered after a process receives any set of
2f+1 PRECOMMIT messages for the current round. If the timeoutPrecommit expires and a process has not
decided yet, the process starts the next round (see the line 65). When a correct process p decides, it starts the
next consensus instance (for the next height). The Gossip communication property ensures that PROPOSAL
and 2f + 1 PREVOTE messages that led p to decide are eventually received by all correct processes, so they
will also decide.
A. Termination mechanism
Tendermint ensures termination by a novel mechanism that benefits from the gossip based nature of commu-
nication (see Gossip communication property). It requires managing two additional variables, validV alue and
validRound that are then used by the proposer during the propose step as explained above. The validV alue
and validRound are updated to v and r by a correct process in a round r when the process receives valid
PROPOSAL message for the value v and the corresponding 2f+1 PREVOTE messages for id(v) in the round
r (see the rule at line 36).
We now give briefly the intuition how managing and proposing validV alue and validRound ensures
termination. Formal treatment is left for Section IV.
The first thing to note is that during good period, because of the Gossip communication property, if a correct
process p locks a value v in some round r, all correct processes will update validV alue to v and validRound to
r before the end of the round r (we prove this formally in the Section IV). The intuition is that messages that led
to p locking a value v in the round r will be gossiped to all correct processes before the end of the round r, so it
will update validV alue and validRound (the line 36). Therefore, if a correct process locks some value during
8As explained above, the possible decision value in a round r is the one for which PROPOSAL and the corresponding 2f+1 PREVOTE
messages are received for the round r.
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9good period, validV alue and validRound are updated by all correct processes so that the value proposed in
the following rounds will be acceptable by all correct processes. Note that it could happen that during good
period, no correct process locks a value, but some correct process q updates validV alue and validRound
during some round. As no correct process locks a value in this case, validV alueq and validRoundq will also
be acceptable by all correct processes as validRoundq > lockedRoundc for every correct process c and as
the Gossip communication property ensures that the corresponding PREVOTE messages that q received in the
round validRoundq are received by all correct processes ∆ time later.
Finally, it could happen that after GST, there is a long sequence of rounds in which no correct process
neither locks a value nor update validV alue and validRound. In this case, during this sequence of rounds,
the proposed value suggested by correct processes was not accepted by all correct processes. Note that this
sequence of rounds is always finite as at the beginning of every round there is at least a single correct process
c such that validV aluec and validRoundc are acceptable by every correct process. This is true as there
exists a correct process c such that for every other correct process p, validRoundc > lockedRoundp or
validV aluec = lockedV aluep. This is true as c is the process that has locked a value in the most recent
round among all correct processes (or no correct process locked any value). Therefore, eventually c will be the
proper in some round and the proposed value will be accepted by all correct processes, terminating therefore
this sequence of rounds.
Therefore, updating validV alue and validRound variables, and the Gossip communication property, to-
gether ensures that eventually, during the good period, there exists a round with a correct proposer whose
proposed value will be accepted by all correct processes, and all correct processes will terminate in that round.
Note that this mechanism, contrary to the common termination mechanism illustrated in the Figure 1, does not
require exchanging any additional information in addition to messages already sent as part of what is normally
being called ”normal” case.
IV. PROOF OF TENDERMINT CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
Lemma 1. For all f ≥ 0, any two sets of processes with voting power at least equal to 2f + 1 have at least
one correct process in common.
Proof: As the total voting power is equal to n = 3f + 1, we have 2(2f + 1) = n + f + 1. This means
that the intersection of two sets with the voting power equal to 2f + 1 contains at least f + 1 voting power
in common, i.e., at least one correct process (as the total voting power of faulty processes is f ). The result
follows directly from this.
Lemma 2. If f + 1 correct processes lock value v in round r0 (lockedV alue = v and lockedRound = r0),
then in all rounds r > r0, they send PREVOTE for id(v) or nil.
Proof: We prove the result by induction on r.
Base step r = r0+1 : Let’s denote with C the set of correct processes with voting power equal to f+1. By
the rules at line 22 and line 28, the processes from the set C can’t accept PROPOSAL for any value different
from v in round r, and therefore can’t send a 〈PREVOTE, heightp, r, id(v
′)〉 message, if v′ 6= v. Therefore,
the Lemma holds for the base step.
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Induction step from r1 to r1 +1: We assume that no process from the set C has sent PREVOTE for values
different than id(v) or nil until round r1 + 1. We now prove that the Lemma also holds for round r1 + 1. As
processes from the set C send PREVOTE for id(v) or nil in rounds r0 ≤ r ≤ r1, by Lemma 1 there is no value
v′ 6= v for which it is possible to receive 2f + 1 PREVOTE messages in those rounds (i). Therefore, we have
for all processes from the set C, lockedV alue = v and lockedRound ≥ r0. Let’s assume by a contradiction
that a process q from the set C sends PREVOTE in round r1 + 1 for value id(v
′), where v′ 6= v. This is
possible only by line 30. Note that this implies that q received 2f + 1 〈PREVOTE, hq, r, id(v
′)〉 messages,
where r > r0 and r < r1 + 1 (see line 29). A contradiction with (i) and Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. Algorithm 1 satisfies Agreement.
Proof: Let round r0 be the first round of height h such that some correct process p decides v. We now
prove that if some correct process q decides v′ in some round r ≥ r0, then v = v
′.
In case r = r0, q has received at least 2f + 1 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, r0, id(v
′)〉 messages at line 49, while
p has received at least 2f + 1 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, r0, id(v)〉 messages. By Lemma 1 two sets of messages of
voting power 2f +1 intersect in at least one correct process. As a correct process sends a single PRECOMMIT
message in a round, then v = v′.
We prove the case r > r0 by contradiction. By the rule 49, p has received at least 2f + 1 voting-
power equivalent of 〈PRECOMMIT, hp, r0, id(v)〉 messages, i.e., at least f +1 voting-power equivalent correct
processes have locked value v in round r0 and have sent those messages (i). Let denote this set of messages with
C. On the other side, q has received at least 2f + 1 voting power equivalent of 〈PRECOMMIT, hq, r, id(v
′)〉
messages. As the voting power of all faulty processes is at most f , some correct process c has sent one of those
messages. By the rule at line 36, c has locked value v′ in round r before sending 〈PRECOMMIT, hq, r, id(v
′)〉.
Therefore c has received 2f + 1 PREVOTE messages for id(v′) in round r > r0 (see line 36). By Lemma 1,
a process from the set C has sent PREVOTE message for id(v′) in round r. A contradiction with (i) and
Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 1 satisfies Validity.
Proof: Trivially follows from the rule at line 50 which ensures that only valid values can be decided.
Lemma 5. If we assume that:
1) a correct process p is the first correct process to enter a round r > 0 at time t > GST (for every correct
process c, roundc ≤ r at time t)
2) the proposer of round r is a correct process q
3) for every correct process c, lockedRoundc ≤ validRoundq at time t
4) timeoutPropose(r) > 2∆+timeoutPrecommit(r−1), timeoutPrevote(r) > 2∆ and timeoutPrecommit(r) >
2∆,
then all correct processes decide in round r before t+ 4∆+ timeoutPrecommit(r − 1).
Proof: As p is the first correct process to enter round r, it executed the line 67 after timeoutPrecommit(r−
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1) expired. Therefore, p received 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT messages in the round r − 1 before time t. By the
Gossip communication property, all correct processes will receive those messages the latest at time t + ∆.
Correct processes that are in rounds < r−1 at time t will enter round r−1 (see the rule at line 56) and trigger
timeoutPrecommit(r− 1) (see rule 47) by time t+∆. Therefore, all correct processes will start round r by
time t+∆+ timeoutPrecommit(r − 1) (i).
In the worst case, the process q is the last correct process to enter round r, so q starts round r and sends
PROPOSAL message for some value v at time t + ∆ + timeoutPrecommit(r − 1). Therefore, all correct
processes receive the PROPOSAL message from q the latest by time t + 2∆ + timeoutPrecommit(r − 1).
Therefore, if timeoutPropose(r) > 2∆ + timeoutPrecommit(r − 1), all correct processes will receive
PROPOSAL message before timeoutPropose(r) expires.
By (3) and the rules at line 22 and 28, all correct processes will accept the PROPOSAL message for value
v and will send a PREVOTE message for id(v) by time t+ 2∆+ timeoutPrecommit(r − 1). Note that by
the Gossip communication property, the PREVOTE messages needed to trigger the rule at line 28 are received
before time t+∆.
By time t + 3∆ + timeoutPrecommit(r − 1), all correct processes will receive PROPOSAL for v and
2f + 1 corresponding PREVOTE messages for id(v). By the rule at line 36, all correct processes will send a
PRECOMMIT message (see line 40) for id(v) by time t + 3∆ + timeoutPrecommit(r − 1). Therefore, by
time t+4∆+ timeoutPrecommit(r− 1), all correct processes will have received the PROPOSAL for v and
2f + 1 PRECOMMIT messages for id(v), so they decide at line 51 on v.
This scenario holds if every correct process q sends a PRECOMMIT message before timeoutPrevote(r)
expires, and if timeoutPrecommit(r) does not expire before t + 4∆ + timeoutPrecommit(r − 1). Let’s
assume that a correct process c1 is the first correct process to trigger timeoutPrevote(r) (see the rule at
line 34) at time t1 > t. This implies that before time t1, c1 received a PROPOSAL (stepc1 must be prevote by
the rule at line 34) and a set of 2f +1 PREVOTE messages. By time t1+∆, all correct processes will receive
those messages. Note that even if some correct process was in the smaller round before time t1, at time t1+∆
it will start round r after receiving those messages (see the rule at line 55). Therefore, all correct processes will
send their PREVOTE message for id(v) by time t1 +∆, and all correct processes will receive those messages
the by time t1 + 2∆. Therefore, as timeoutPrevote(r) > 2∆, this ensures that all correct processes receive
PREVOTE messages from all correct processes before their respective local timeoutPrevote(r) expire.
On the other hand, timeoutPrecommit(r) is triggered in a correct process c2 after it receives any set
of 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT messages for the first time. Let’s denote with t2 > t the earliest point in time
timeoutPrecommit(r) is triggered in some correct process c2. This implies that c2 has received at least f +1
PRECOMMIT messages for id(v) from correct processes, i.e., those processes have received PROPOSAL for
v and 2f +1 PREVOTE messages for id(v) before time t2. By the Gossip communication property, all correct
processes will receive those messages by time t2 +∆, and will send PRECOMMIT messages for id(v). Note
that even if some correct processes were at time t2 in a round smaller than r, by the rule at line 55 they will
enter round r by time t2+∆. Therefore, by time t2 +2∆, all correct processes will receive PROPOSAL for v
and 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT messages for id(v). So if timeoutPrecommit(r) > 2∆, all correct processes will
decide before the timeout expires.
September 25, 2018 DRAFT
12
Lemma 6. If a correct process p locks a value v at time t0 > GST in some round r (lockedV alue = v and
lockedRound = r) and timeoutPrecommit(r) > 2∆, then all correct processes set validV alue to v and
validRound to r before starting round r + 1.
Proof: In order to prove this Lemma, we need to prove that if the process p locks a value v at time t0,
then no correct process will leave round r before time t0 +∆ (unless it has already set validV alue to v and
validRound to r). It is sufficient to prove this, since by the Gossip communication property the messages that
p received at time t0 and that triggered rule at line 36 will be received by time t0+∆ by all correct processes,
so all correct processes that are still in round r will set validV alue to v and validRound to r (by the rule
at line 36). To prove this, we need to compute the earliest point in time a correct process could leave round r
without updating validV alue to v and validRound to r (we denote this time with t1). The Lemma is correct
if t0 +∆ < t1.
If the process p locks a value v at time t0, this implies that p received the valid PROPOSAL message for v
and 2f +1 〈PREVOTE, h, r, id(v)〉 at time t0. At least f +1 of those messages are sent by correct processes.
Let’s denote this set of correct processes as C. By Lemma 1 any set of 2f + 1 PREVOTE messages in round
r contains at least a single message from the set C.
Let’s denote as time t the earliest point in time a correct process, c1, triggered timeoutPrevote(r). This
implies that c1 received 2f + 1 PREVOTE messages (see the rule at line 34), where at least one of those
messages was sent by a process c2 from the set C. Therefore, process c2 had received PROPOSAL message
before time t. By the Gossip communication property, all correct processes will receive PROPOSAL and 2f+1
PREVOTE messages for round r by time t+∆. The latest point in time p will trigger timeoutPrevote(r) is
t+∆9. So the latest point in time p can lock the value v in round r is t0 = t+∆+ timeoutPrevote(r) (as at
this point timeoutPrevote(r) expires, so a process sends PRECOMMIT nil and updates step to precommit,
see line 61).
Note that according to the Algorithm 1, a correct process can not send a PRECOMMIT message before
receiving 2f+1 PREVOTE messages. Therefore, no correct process can send a PRECOMMIT message in round
r before time t. If a correct process sends a PRECOMMIT message for nil, it implies that it has waited for
the full duration of timeoutPrevote(r) (see line 63)10. Therefore, no correct process can send PRECOMMIT
for nil before time t+ timeoutPrevote(r) (*).
A correct process q that enters round r+1 must wait (i) timeoutPrecommit(r) (see line 67) or (ii) receiving
f + 1 messages from the round r + 1 (see the line 55). In the former case, q receives 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT
messages before starting timeoutPrecommit(r). If at least a single PRECOMMIT message from a correct
process (at least f + 1 voting power equivalent of those messages is sent by correct processes) is for nil,
then q cannot start round r + 1 before time t1 = t+ timeoutPrevote(r) + timeoutPrecommit(r) (see (*)).
Therefore in this case we have: t0 +∆ < t1, i.e., t+ 2∆+ timeoutPrevote(r) < t+ timeoutPrevote(r) +
timeoutPrecommit(r), and this is true whenever timeoutPrecommit(r) > 2∆, so Lemma holds in this
case.
9Note that even if p was in smaller round at time t it will start round r by time t+∆.
10The other case in which a correct process PRECOMMIT for nil is after receiving 2f + 1 Prevote for nil messages, see the line
45. By Lemma 1, this is not possible in round r.
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If in the set of 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT messages q receives, there is at least a single PRECOMMIT for
id(v) message from a correct process c, then q can start the round r + 1 the earliest at time t1 = t +
timeoutPrecommit(r). In this case, by the Gossip communication property, all correct processes will receive
PROPOSAL and 2f+1 PREVOTE messages (that c received before time t) the latest at time t+∆. Therefore, q
will set validV alue to v and validRound to r the latest at time t+∆. As t+∆ < t+timeoutPrecommit(r),
whenever timeoutPrecommit(r) > ∆, the Lemma holds also in this case.
In case (ii), q received at least a single message from a correct process c from the round r+1. The earliest
point in time c could have started round r+1 is t+ timeoutPrecommit(r) in case it received a PRECOMMIT
message for v from some correct process in the set of 2f + 1 PRECOMMIT messages it received. The same
reasoning as above holds also in this case, so q set validV alue to v and validRound to r the latest by time
t+∆. As t+∆ < t+ timeoutPrecommit(r), whenever timeoutPrecommit(r) > ∆, the Lemma holds also
in this case.
Lemma 7. Algorithm 1 satisfies Termination.
Proof: Lemma 5 defines a scenario in which all correct processes decide. We now prove that within a
bounded duration after GST such a scenario will unfold. Let’s assume that at time GST the highest round
started by a correct process is r0, and that there exists a correct process p such that the following holds: for
every correct process c, lockedRoundc ≤ validRoundp. Furthermore, we assume that p will be the proposer
in some round r1 > r (this is ensured by the proposer function).
We have two cases to consider. In the first case, for all rounds r ≥ r0 and r < r1, no correct process locks a
value (set lockedRound to r). So in round r1 we have the scenario from the Lemma 5, so all correct processes
decides in round r1.
In the second case, a correct process locks a value v in round r2, where r2 ≥ r0 and r2 < r1. Let’s assume
that r2 is the highest round before r1 in which some correct process q locks a value. By Lemma 6 at the end of
round r2 the following holds for all correct processes c: validV aluec = lockedV alueq and validRoundc = r2.
Then in round r1, the conditions for the Lemma 5 holds, so all correct processes decide.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new Byzantine-fault tolerant consensus algorithm that is the core of the Tendermint BFT
SMR platform. The algorithm is designed for the wide area network with high number of mutually distrusted
nodes that communicate over gossip based peer-to-peer network. It has only a single mode of execution and
the communication pattern is very similar to the ”normal” case of the state-of-the art PBFT algorithm. The
algorithm ensures termination with a novel mechanism that takes advantage of the gossip based communication
between nodes. The proposed algorithm and the proofs are simple and elegant, and we believe that this makes
it easier to understand and implement correctly.
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